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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, in the 
interest of 
P.L.L. 
a person under 18 years 
of age. 
Case No. 15947 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF 'l'HE CASE 
This is an appeal by the natural mother from an 
Order of the First District Juvenile Court for Weber 
County, Utah, Judge L. Kent Bachman presiding, entered 
on June 22, 1978, permanently lerminaling all parental 
rights of appellant in connection with her child, P.L.L. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On June 22, 1978, the juvenile court found appellant 
to be incompetent by reason of conduct or condition 
seriously detrimental to her child, and ordered that 
the parental rights of Mary Ellen Lavine, the appellant 
herein, be permanently terminated. (R.8l). The court 
further ordered that the child be placed in the custody 
of the Utah State Division of Family Services. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the juvenile court's 
order terminating parental rights. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with appellant's Statement of Facts 
with the following exceptions and additions: 
1. The child, P.L.L.,was placed in the custody 
of the Division of Family Services at birth by order of 
the juvenile court dated July 18, 1973. (R.2). The 
child's physicial condition, coupled with the doctor's 
conviction that the mother was incapable of providing 
proper care resulted in Division of Family Service 
custody frorn the time of the child's birth. (TR. 118) . 
It was not the child' s condition alone as appellant 
asserts. (Appellant's Brief, p.2). 
2. The visitations which were arranqed by Mr. 
Mullens (Appellant's Brief, p.2) took place at the 
Division of Family Services office, because Mr. t1ullens 
did not consider appellant's living quarters appropriate 
for a child. (TR. 71-72). 
3. Appellant's statement on page 3 of her brief 
regarding visitations arranged by Ms. Rowe is noticeably 
undetailed. The record reflects, in detail, all of the 
visits arranged by Ms. Rowe. In actuality, only the 
-2-
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first three-hour visit on August 1, 1974, was recorded 
without problems (TR. 86). Afterward, when Ms. Rowe 
allowed visits for longer periods of time, the record 
is replete with resulting problems. 
The first overnight visit took place on August 6-7, 
1974. When Ms. Rowe delivered the baby to the mother, 
she instructed her on the proper way to feed the baby, 
emphasizing the special problems created by the cleft 
pallat, how to bathe and clothe her, and what time the 
child should be put to bed. (TR. 89). When Ms. Rowe 
picked up the child the next day, the baby had a hard 
sucker in her mouth, had not been bathed, had not been 
cleaned after diaper changes, and had not been put 
to bed until 3:00a.m. (TR. 88-90). 
A second overnight visit was arranged on August 27-
28, 1974. When Ms. Rowe returned to pick up the child, 
the baby was very tired, her hair was matted together 
with a stickly substance, her nose had run and dried 
all over her face, and she appeared not to have been 
bathed. (TR.91). Upon return to the foster home, the 
child was wheezing and coughing, and her nightgown in 
her suitcase was found to be soaking wet and filthy. 
(TR. 92). Again, the mother had been instructed on how 
to care for the child. (TR. 91). 
-3-
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After the third visit, the child had on dirty 
underclothes and was tired. (TR. 93). 
When Ms. Rowe next went to the appellant's house, 
she found it in a state of complete filth, as described 
in the transcript at pages 94-95. 
After instruction and prodding by Ms. Rowe, the 
appellant managed to clean up the house (TR. 96), and 
Ms. Rowe agreed to allow a week long visit which 
commenced on October 22, 1974. Two days later Ms. Rowe 
returned to find the baby very dirty and the house 
malodorous, with spilled garbage all over. (TR. 97-98). 
After a four-day visit in November, 1974, Ms. Rowe 
did no~ find the baby at the appellant's house when 
she went to pick her up. (TR. 101). She located her 
at her maternal grandmother's, and found her to be 
subdued and somewhat melancholy. (TR. 102). 
From the record detailing the visits arranged by 
Ms. Rowe, it appears that almost all were "less than 
successful," as stated by appellant at page 3 of her 
brief. 
4. Appellant's conclusion that the quality of care 
provided by the mother improved considerably subsequent 
to her attendance at parenting classes is not supported 
by the record. The child was dirty after a visjt on 
January 13, 1975 (TR. 103), and was tired and djrty 
-4-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
after an overnight visit on March 29-31, 1975. (TR. 
104). 
5. Appellant's assertion on page 5 that by 
December 9, 1975, active steps were being taken by Ms. 
Gearhart to terminate parental rights is a misstatement 
of the facts. At that point, Ms. Gearhart had only decided 
to explore termination as a possible alternative in this 
case. (TR. 155). 
6. The appellant refrains from giving the reason 
that Ms. Gearhart stopped the child's visits with her 
grandparents. (Appellant's Brief, p.7). After the child 
had undergone surgery for the cleft pallat, Ms. Gearhart 
attempted to take the child for a visit with the grand-
parents. When they pulled up in front of the grandparents' 
house, the child became extremely upset and threw a 
tantrum, crying and screaming very loudly. (TR. 145). 
Ms. Gearhart felt that such emotional and physical 
exertion was harmful to the child after having recently 
had surgery, so cancelled the visit. The grandparents 
were informed of this and the reasons for it by telephone. 
(TR. 145). 
7. The appellant's right to visitation was not 
affected in any way by Ms. Gearhart's actions regarding 
the grandparents' visits. Appellant could have requested 
visits at any time. (TR. 147). 
-5-
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8. Appellant's Statement of Facts omits any mention 
of the facts attested to by the psychologists who were 
called as expert witnesses. Appellant's intelligence 
level and capacity would classify her as borderline 
mentally retarded. (TR. 29). Appellant was diagnosed as 
having a passive dependent personality, which means that 
she takes a passive stance in life, depending on others 
to provide her with the basic necessities of life. Dr. 
Paul T. Furlong testified that with her intellectual 
capacities and personality traits, the appellant may 
be able to provide basic survival care to a child, 
that the child would likely survive but would not 
necessarily thrive or be stimulated. (TR. 42). Dr. 
Richard Grow testified that with training, the appellant 
may be able to learn basic survival skills, but no 
other more advanced parenting skills. (TR. 66). Dr. 
Furlong also testified that the appellant lacks the 
sophistication and ability to train a child to fit 
into society in a reasonably adequate fashion. (TR. 44). 
After a lengthy trial at which the Juvenile Court 
judge had the opportunity to hear and weigh all of these 
facts, the court found that the appellant "is incompetent 
by reason of her condition and conduct which is seriously 
detrimental to the child," and ordered that all parental 
rights be terminated. (R. 291-292). 
-6-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ALLOWING THE APPELLANT TO TESTIFY AS A WITNESS 
IN THIS CASE DID NOT VIOLATE HER FIFTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Appellant characterizes the juvenile court proceeding 
in a termination case as "an adult case, and a forfeiture 
proceeding of a quasi-criminal nature to which the Fifth 
Amendment privileqe against self-incrimination must apply." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.7). However, the denomination of 
the proceeding as civil, criminal, adult, or juvenile 
is inconsequential for Fifth-Amendment purposes. It is 
well established that the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incriminaiton applies to juvenile court proceedings, 
Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Further, it is 
not important whether the proceedings are denominated 
civil or criminal because the Fifth Amendment privilege 
generally applies in either case. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 
431 u.s. 801, 805 (1977), citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 
1, 11 (1964), Justice White concurring, in Murphy v. Nater-
front Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964). Therefore 
appellant's belabored efforts to categorize action as an 
adult proceeding in order to invoke application of the 
Fifth Amendment is unnecessary and moot. 
-7-
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Respondent has some problem with appellant's 
characterization of a juvenile court termination proceedin? 
as a forfeiture proceeding, although it is an unnecessary 
argument for analysis of the Fifth Amendment privilege. 
Respondent points out that a parent does not have the same 
kind of property interest in a child as she would in a 
chattel. As was discussed by a federal district court in 
Organization of Foster Families v. Dumpson, 418 F.Supp. 
277, 282 (S.D.!J.Y. 1976), "The time has long siilce pass('d 
when children were considered mere chattels of the adults 
with whom they lived." To treat the parent-child 
relationship as one would that of a property owner to 
his chattel is to totally overlook the rights of a child 
as a person. (See Point V , infra.) There are at least 
two individuals with protected rights involved in a 
termination proceeding, so it is very unlike a forfeiture 
proceeding in nature or purpose. 
ih th the fundamental principle that the Fi fth-Amendmer 
privilege applies in juvenile court proceedings agreed 
upon, it is necessary to evaluate appellant's argument in 
terms of whether any error, reversible or otherwise, was 
committed in allowing appellant to testify as a witness 
in the court below. 
-8-
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The appellant was represented by counsel at all 
relevant stages of the proceedings which 
this court now reviews. Appellant's counsel, Mr. 
Hasenyager, generally objected to the calling of the 
appellant, Mary Ellen Clark Lavine, to testify as a 
witness. (TR. 195). However, Ms. Lavine was only a 
witness,not a defendant. A termination action in juvenile 
court is a proceeding in regard to the child, not the parent. 
The parent is not a defendant as in a criminal case. It 
is only in appellant's brief that there is any assertion 
that the purpose of a termination hearing is to place 
guilt or find "wrongful" conduct. The question of a 
p2rent's conduct or condition in a termination proceeding 
is not to be measured in terms of "right or wrong", but 
rather by the effect of that conduct on a child. The 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination does 
not allow a witness to refuse to testify altogether. 
The general objection by appellant's counsel as to 
allowing appellant to testify was properly denied. (TR.l99). 
At the stage of the proceedings when the general 
objection was entered, no questions had been put to Mary 
Ellen Lavine. It is well-accepted that the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege does not come into operation until specific 
questions are asked, U.S. v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845 
(5th Cir. 1969), General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 
-9-
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481 F.2d 1204 (1973) cert. den. 414 U.S. 1162 (1974), 
~v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1974), the answers 
to which might later subject the witness to criminal 
prosecution. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 
805 (1977). 
The testimony which appellant gave at the hearing 
below produced no evidence which might subject her to 
future criminal prosecution. The attorney for the state, 
Mr. Daines, attempted to follow a line of questioning 
regarding prostitution. Counsel for appellant made a 
Fifth Amendment objection. To the extent that the 
Juvenile Court allowed this line of questioning, no 
evidence came forth which could incriminate or support 
future criminal prosecutions of appellant. (TR. 222-230). 
Reference was made to taxes not filed by Mrs. Lavine, 
which information might possibly subject her to criminal 
liability. However, no claim of privilege was made to 
these questions by either the appellant or her counsel. 
It is necessary that a claim of privilege be made since 
witnesses may waive their privilege against self-incrim-
ination if it is not asserted. U.S. v. Mania, 317 U.S. 
424, 427 (1943). 
There was no valid claim of privileqe in this case. 
This court stated in State v. Anderson, 495 P.2d 804, 
-10-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(Utah, 1972) that: 
An attorney for a witness cannot claim 
a privilege against self-incrimination; 
he can only advise the witness. In order 
for the claim to be honored by the court, 
it must be made by the witness. 
Counsel for appellant tried several times to raise a 
Fifth Amendment claim of privilege, but appellant never 
made such a claim herself. Although the court allowed 
the appellant to t0~~ify, there was no evidence adduced 
which could subject appellant to criminal prosecution, 
so appellant was not unlawfully required to testify 
"against" herself within the meaning of those words. 
It is interesting that although appellant makes such 
an extensive Fifth Amendment argument in her brief, there 
is absolutely no claim that her testimony produced any 
evidence which was influential in the court's decision. 
The court will note that of the important facts contained 
in the Statement of Facts in the briefs of both parties, 
no facts adduced from Mrs. Lavine's testimony are included. 
The findings and conclusions of the Juvenile Court, as 
articulated by Judge Bachman, are not based upon any 
information gained from the appellant's testimony. {R. 81). 
Appellant testified only as a witness in the hearing 
below. There v1as no evidence obtained from her testimony 
which might incriminate her for future criminal proceedings, 
-11-
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and there is not even any indication that her testimony 
damaged her in this proceeding. The court below committed 
no reversible error in allowing appellant to testify. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT l;'l\S GIVEN REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO 
CORRECT THE INADEQUACIES IN HER ABILITY TO CAPB 
FOR HER CHILD. 
P.L.L., the minor child involved in this case, is 
now over five year~ old. She has been in a foster home, 
under the custody and supervision of the Division of 
Family Services, since her birth. For over four years 
the Division of Family Services worked with the mother 
to provide opportunity for her to learn how to care and 
provide for her child. Numerous home visits were arranged 
between mother and child, and the motP.er was instructed 
on the very basic necessities of how to care for the child. 
Appellant's claims in Point II of her brief that she did 
not have the opportunity to improve herself and adequately 
prepare herself to receive custody of her child are un-
founded. Only after four years of trying to maintain 
the natural parent-child relationship did the Division of 
Family Services determine that the child's best interests 
required a terminat.ion of parental rights. The appellant 
simply cannot clilim that she had insufficient t.ime or 
-12-
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opportunities to correct the inadequacies in her capacity 
to care for P.L.L. 
The record shows that there was an extended period of 
trial and error during which time the appellant was given 
instruction in how to provide basic survival care for her 
child. Most of these incidents are detailed in Respondent's 
Statement of Facts. A brief summary follows: 
1. During the period from July to November, 1973, 
the child received medical treatment in the hospital and 
then efforts were concentrated on placing her in an 
appropriate foster home. (TR. 69). 
2. When the case was assigned to Mr. Mullens, a 
social worker, in November, 1973, he arranged for and 
secured psychological evaluations on the appellant to 
determine her needs, strengths, and deficiencies. (TR. 70). 
3. Between November, 1973, and May, 1974, Mr. 
Mullens arranged visits between mother and child, which 
took place in the offices of the Division of Family 
Services because the worker felt uncomfortable about 
taking a bahy into appellant's current living quarters. 
(TR. 71). Although several visits were cancelled either 
because the baby, the appellant or her husband was ill, 
at least four visits did take place. (TR. 78). During 
at least one of these vistis, the social worker instructed 
-13-
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the appellant on how to feed the baby, pointing out 
the special problems caused by the cleft pallat. He 
also demonstrated the feeding method, as he had been 
instructed by the doctor. (TR. 73). Appellant seemed 
able to feed the baby correctly at that time. Mr. 
Mullens testified that the Division's major objective 
during the first year of the child's life was to make 
sure the child's medical needs were met. 
4. The worker assigned to the case between May and 
July, 1974, was not called to testify, but the record 
does indicate that several visits were arranged during 
that time. (TR.l07-108). 
5. On August 6, 1974, the child was delivered to 
the mother with specific instructions on feeding, bathing 
and bedtime with emphasis regarding the child's cleft 
pallat and special feeding needs. (TR. 89). On August 7, 
when the child was picked up by the social worker, she 
has a hard Sugar Daddy sucker in her mouth, was dirty, 
and had not been put to bed until 3:00 a.m. (TR. 88-90). 
The child was just one year old. 
6. On August 27, 1974, the child was delivered to 
the mother, again with specific instructions regarding 
the simple necessities of bathing, feeding, and bedtiQe. 
The child was returned very dirty, tired, and improperly 
clothed. (TR. 91). 
-14-
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7. During a week long visit in October, 1974, the 
social worker had to keep almost a constant surveillance 
to insure that the child was cleaned and the house didn't 
fall into a state of filth. (TR. 97-98). Again, the 
social worker, Ms. Rowe, testified that she gave the 
same basic instructions to appellant at the beginning of 
each visit. (TR. 109), and asked appellant if she under-
stood or to repeat the instructions. (TR. 110). Nonethe-
luss, appellant continued to perform inadequately and th2 
child was returned in unsatisfactory condition. 
In the fall of 1974, the Division of Family Services 
referred the appellant to the Skills Center of Neber County 
Mental Health for the purpose of attending parenting 
classes and receiving specialized instruction in parenting 
skills. (TR. 113). Such classes are provided at no cost 
to participants. Even after appellant had reportedly 
attended such parenting classes for several months (TR. 113), 
she still failed to adequately perform the basic function 
of bathing and keeping the baby clean. (TR. 103, 104). 
When Vickie Rowe, the social worker during much of 
1974-75, was asked why she kept trying, she replied that 
she kept hoping that with teaching, the mother's parenting 
would improve. (TR. 93). It c:an hardly be said that no 
efforts were made to train the mother, and it was certainly 
not unreasonable for the Juvenile Court judge, after hearing 
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all the testimony, to conclude that the Division had 
afforded the appellant sufficient training and opportuniti~ 
to learn basic mothering skills. (TR. 290). These efforts 
largely failed, and for almost a year and a half, the 
appellant didn't even request any more home visits. (TR. 13;: 
She made no efforts then, but takes the position now that 
the Division of Family Services must continue for an 
indefinite period of time to assist her. The appellant 
has limited learning capacities. She has not r~sponced 
well even to basic training in survival care. It would be 
unfair to the child to keep her in a temporary foster 
care situation for years while interminable efforts are 
being made to train her mother, especially when the 
prognosis is doubtful. 
Appellant claims on page 13 of her brief that the most 
significant failure of the Division of Family Services 
was a failure to extend reasonable efforts of assistance 
to appellant to correct her deficiencies prior to filing 
a petition for termination of parental rights. On the 
contrary, the Division had kept P.L.L. in foster care 
for over four years before filing for termination. All 
of the training and in-home visitations previously discusse 
took place before the petition was filed. During the 
last year and a half of the period, appe1lant did not 
even request additional in-home visits. 
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The duty of the Division of Family Services to assist 
a parent in overcoming her parenting deficiencies, as 
articulated by this court in State v. Lance, 464 P.2d 
395 (Utah 1970) and State in the Interest of Walter B., 
577 P.2d 119 (Utah 1978), only goes so far. 
In State in Interest of Mario A., 514 P.2d 797 
(Utah 1973), this court said that: 
"We do not think caseworkers are obligated 
to go to the extremes which appellant claims 
they should have done in order to kindle 
and increase a small flame of desire to be 
reunited with her children." 514 P.2d at 
799. 
In the present case, the Division of Family Services 
did make reasonable efforts over an extended period 
of time to aid the appellant and provide her with 
opportunities to maintain her parent-child relationship. 
However, at some point the Division's duty to protect 
the best interests of the child must take over, and the 
Division must take approprinte steps to provide the child 
with a stable, stimulating family environment. 
Appellant submits that "the capacity to provide 
basic survival care is in itself sufficient to defeat a 
termination petition." (Appellant's Brief, p.l4). First 
of all, the record indicates that appellant did not 
demonstrate a significant capacity to provide even basic 
survival care. Even if she had such capacity, it would 
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not be sufficient in and of itself to defeat the terminatiw 
petition. 
In the most recent case decided by this court regardina 
termination of parental rights, State in the Interest of 
R.J., H.J., and D.J., (Dec. 15, 1978, No. 15386), the 
mother was found to be "unable to provide an environment 
which would stimulate intellectual or emotional growth 
in her children." (Dec. 15, 1978, p.2). It was also 
found that "neither parent has been able to respond to or 
cooperate in assistance offered by Social Services over 
a period of several years." Id. This court affirmed 
the Juvenile Court's judgment that: 
•.. [T)he natural parents are socially and 
emotionally retarded and unable or unwilling 
to psychologically, emotionally, and/or 
socially stimulate the above children to 
the degree that they are failing to develop 
properly and said failure is seriously detri-
mental to the welfare of said children. Id. 
Thus, this court has recognized that children require 
more than basic survival care. They also require and 
deserve at least some degree of intellectual, emotional, 
and social stimulation. 
A recent case in the Virgin Islands, In re Maria, 
Elisa, and Norma C., 5 FLR 2089 (Terr. Ct. USVI, Nov. 
16, 1978) discusses a situation remarkably similar in 
facts to the present case. In doing so, the Territorial 
Court cited the Utah statute and practice regarding 
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termination of parental rights. The mother in that case 
was also slightly mentally retarded. The father was 69 
and had just suffered an incapacitating massive heart 
attack. The court held: 
"The facts before the court clearly and 
convincingly establish that Mr. Gabino 
C. and Mrs. Luz C. are not capable of 
adequately parenting their minor children ...• 
Without doubt, Mr. and Mrs. C. are incapable 
of meeting the psychological, emotional, 
and intellectual needs of their children. 
At best, the C's can provide their three 
daughters with no more than the basic 
physical necessities of life." 5 FLR 
2090. (Emphasis added.) 
The court concluded that the conduct and condition of 
the patents were seriously detrimental to the children, 
and parental rights were terminated. 5 FLR at 2090. 
The courts are recognizing that adequate parenting 
involves more than simply providing basic survival care. 
Appellant asserts that she had the capability to provide 
basic survival care, without training, (Appellant's 
Brief, p.l4) but the record does not support such an 
assertion. Neither psychologist testified that appellant 
could provide survival care without training, only that 
she probably had the capacity to provide such care with 
training. (TR. 42,65). When given instruction in basic 
skills such as bathing, feeding, and bedtime, the appellant 
did not respond with a convincing demonstration of her 
ability to learn survival care. But even if we assume 
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that she can eventually learn the skills necess~ry to keep 
a child alive, there has been little or no hope offered 
that appellant would ever be able to provide her child 
with anything more than basic survival care. Dr. Furlong 
testified that appellant did not have the ability to 
provide the stimulation or training necessary for a child 
to fit into society in a reasonably adequate fashion. 
(TR. 44}. Dr. Grow testified that the appellant was not 
capable of learning more than basic survival skills. 
(TR. 66). With this type of prognosis, one wonders how 
much training the Division of Family Services was expected 
to provide, and for how many years, before coming to the 
same concluslon -- that the appellant lacks the capacity 
to provide adequate parenting to her daughter. 
The Juvenile Court judge heard all the testimony, 
considered all the facts presented, found that there had 
been adequate attempts at instruction and training, and 
that c.ppellant has made "no significant progress". (TR. 
290). The trial court is in the best position to analyze 
and find the facts, and as this court said in R.J., H.J., 
D.J., supra, "[t]he general rule that we will usually 
defer to the trial court's factual findings, applies to 
juvenile proceedings." Dec. 15, 1978, p.2, fn. 6, citing 
State v. Dade, 376 P.2d 948 (Utah 1962}. As Justice 
Crockett said in his dissenting opinion in State in tlte 
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Interest of Walter B., supra: 
[I]f this entire record is surveyed in 
the light of the established rules of 
review, allowing the Juvenile Court its 
prerogative of finding the facts, and 
of exercising its judgment as to the best 
interest and welfare of this child, there 
is no basis shown which should persuade 
this Court to disturb the findings and 
order made. 577 P.2d at 126. 
In the present case, the record fully supports the 
findings of the lower court that the Division of Family 
Services attempted to allow the appellant to care for 
her child and to train her to provide adequate parenting; 
and that the appellant's unsatisfactory performance and 
inability to learn, together with the child's best interests, 
now require termination of parental rights. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT'S CONDUCT AND CONDITION MUST BE 
ANALYZED IN CONNECTION h'ITH HER INDIVIDUAL 
RELATIONSHIP WITH HER CHILD, AND NOT IN 
TERMS OF A NATIONAL STATISTICAL CATEGORY. 
Point III of appellant's brief sounds rather like the 
age-old excuse a child gives his parent to justify some 
\·lrongdoing. "But Hom, everybody else does it!" 
Appellant's argument seems to be that there are 
statistically quite a number of people in the United 
States who are at the same or lower intelligence level 
as the appellant. Many of those people may have children. 
tlany may not be providing their children with the care 
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and stimulation that would all01·7 them to thrive. (Appellant' 
Brief, p. 17). However, appellant is an individual with 
unique problems. Her child is also an individual, and the 
child also has some unique problems. The task of the 
Juvenile Court is to determine whether this mother's 
conduct or condition is seriously detri~ental to this 
child. The fact that the court cannot solve all the 
problems which may exist in homes around the country 
should not prevent it from doing its best in this particul~ 
case. 
As Dr. Grow testified, the appellant's condition may 
not be as common as her statistics indicate. {Appellant's 
full scale IQ is approximately at the 6th percentile 
nationally, TR. 30). Dr. Grow indicated that in judging 
a person's parenting abilities, one must consider more 
than her intellectual capacity alone. The person may 
have strenyths separate and apart from her intelligence 
level which could enable her to be quite a satisfactory 
parent. (TR. 6 5) . Many of the people in appellant's 
statistical group who have approximately the same 
intellectual capabilities may have many compensating 
traits which allow them to care adequately for their 
children. These people have to be judged as individuals, 
not simply as a member of SO!'le statistical group. 
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However, Dr. Grow testified that he looked for 
positive traits and strengths in Mary Ellen Lavine's 
personality, and found them lacking. (TR. 65,67). 
Appellant not only suffers from slight mental 
retardation and very limited learning capacity, she also 
lacks compensating traits on the positive side of the 
ledger. In this way she may differ from many others in 
the country with her same mental condition who are raising 
children. In examining the particulars of this case, 
the Juvenile Court was justified in finding that this mother 
could not adequately care for this child. 
There may well be other failing families around the 
country. But when the courts of this state are presented 
with an appropriate case for remedial action, they should 
not hesitate merely because they are unable to remedy all 
similar households. An analogy might be made to child 
abuse. Child abuse is certainly not uncommon in this 
country. The courts are not able to convict all child 
abusers. However, when there is sufficient evidence to 
convict one child abuser, the court does not hesitate to 
do so. 
In this case, the Juvenile Court was presented with 
sufficient evidence to support termination of parental 
rights as between this parent and this child. The lower 
court's decision should not be overturned on the grounds 
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that similar problems may exist in other families. 
POINT IV 
THE DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES WORKED ACTIVELY 
TO BUILD AND IMPROVE APPELLANT'S PARENT-CHILD 
RELATIONSHIP BEFORE DECIDING TO PETITION FOR 
TEru1INATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS. 
The Division of Family Services worked with appellant 
and her child for over four years. Numerous visits were 
arranged, and instruction was given on how to care for 
the child. (See Point II, supra). Nonetheless, appellant 
asserts in Point IV of her brief that the Division engaged 
in a deliberate and calculated plan to destroy her relatio~ 
ship with her child. There is absolutely no evidence in 
the record of any deliberate, calculated plan, either 
individually or as a conspiratorial scheme, to alienate 
the child from the parent or the parent from the child. 
This assertion rests solely on the fact that when Mr. 
Gearhart was assigned to the case as a social worker, 
she did not take active steps to arrange visits between 
appellant and the child. Visits were never denied to 
the appellant, she just never asked for them. (TR. 14 6, 147 
Appellant is an adult claiming to have sufficient under-
standing, capacity, and desire to have full custody of 
her child. If such is the case, and if in fact she did 
want to maintain relationship with the child and eventuull: 
regain custody, she certainly should have requested 
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visitation on her own, which she never did. 
Ms. Gearhart did terminate the visits with the 
grandparents. The circumstances surrounding this matter 
have already been discussed. (See page 5 , supra). 
Whether Ms. Gearhart's actions regarding the grandparents' 
visits \vere proper is irrelevant for purposes of this 
action. Appellant's visitations were not contingent 
upon the grandparents' visits. So by terminating the 
grandparents' visitation, Ms. Gearhart did nothing to 
deny appellant the right to see her child. 
Appellant puts too much emphasis on the fact that 
she did not see her daughter for a year and a half. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 18). Appellant's parental rights 
were not terminated solely because she did not request 
visits. There were several factors which combined to 
make her conduct and condition seriously detrimental to 
the child. (See Juvenile Court Order, TR. 289-292). 
There is an underlying fallacy in much of appellant's 
argument. If at some point the Division of Family Services 
did not make the decision that steps should be initiated 
to terminate parental rights, no petition would ever get 
filed. It doesn't all happen on its own. vlhen ~1rs. 
Gearhart took over the case, she reviewed the record 
and saw that no significant progress had been made by 
appellant in caring for the child. She was aware of 
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appellant's mental condition and intelligence level which 
indicated that it was unlikely that she would ever learn 
adequate parenting skills. She could see that appellant 
had not responded well to instruction on basic survival 
skills. The child had never lived with appellant, had 
been in the foster care program for several years, and 
really had little to look forward to except more years 
in foster care. At that point r1s. Gearhart decided that 
the interests of the child would best be served by initiati:' 
some steps toward termination of parental rights. 
In cases such as this, the Division of Family Services
1 
must be concerned with two sets of interests--those of 
the parent and those of the child. The interests of the 
parent should not be allowed to subvert those of the child. 
In its most recent pronouncement on this. subject, 
this court acknowledged that the interests of the child 
should be paramount. "Although courts are reluctant to 
perform social surgery in permanently terminating the 
natural parent-child relationship, the welfare of the 
child is the paramount consideration." State in Interest 
of R.J., H.J., D.J., supra, Dec. 15, 1978, p.2. (emphasis 
added.) 
This court has stated on many other occasions that thE 
ultimate and most important test in a termination case must 
be the interest and the welfare of the child, which cancer 
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must outweigh any right or privilege of the natural 
parent. In the case of State v. Dade, 376 P.2d 948, 949, 
(Utah, 1962), the court said: 
"Quite beyond and more important than the 
rights and privileges of the parents is 
the welfare of these children and their 
prospects for becoming well-adjusted, self-
sustaining individuals. This is the con-
sideration of paramount importance." 
In the termination case of State in the Interest of Jennings, 
432 P.2d 879, 880 (Utah, 1967), this court stated: 
"While ordinarily the parents have a right 
to the custody of their children, the State 
also has an interest in the welfare of 
children, which is paramount thereto." 
In the termination case of State in the Interest of A, supra, 
514 P.2d at 797, 799 (Utah, 1973), this court stated: 
"While one feels deeply for a parent who 
is deprived of a child that feeling must 
not overcome the duty placed upon the 
court to act in the best interest of the 
child." 
In the termination case of In re Interest of Winger, 
558 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah, 1976) this court stated: 
"There is a presumption of great strength, 
that it is in the best interests of the child 
to be reared by its natural parents. This 
presumption is only overcome when the trier 
of facts is convinced by a preponderance of 
the evidence the welfare of the child requires 
termination." 
Finally, in the termination case of In re the Interest of 
S.J., H.J. and S.J., 576 P.2d 1280, 1283 (Utah, 1978), 
this court stated: 
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"It was also fair and reasonable to further 
conclude that the rights of the parents were 
secondary in importance since they were in 
direct conflict with and contrary to the 
best interest of the children." 
In the present case, the decision to petition for 
termination of parental rights was made in consideration 
of the best interests of the child after long term efforts I 
had been made to aid the natural mother. There was nothing 
irresponsible or inappropriate in the actions taken by the 
Division of Family Services, which must protect the child's 
interests as well as those of a parent. 
POINT V 
THE MINOR CHILD, P.L.L., HAS A CONSTITUTIONALLY 
PROTECTED RIGHT TO THE PRESERVATION OF IT'S BEST 
INTEREST. 
Minor child P.L.L. was born out of wedlock on July 10, 
1973. (R.S). It was born with a hole in its throat, a 
cleft pallat, a possible hearing loss, a turned out right 
foot, and an anticipated susceptability to respiratory 
disease. (TR. 46,70,118). The child was kept in the 
hospital where delivered for approximately two weeks for 
tests. (TR. 118). The attending physician refused to 
release the child to its natural mother because she was 
not able to care for the baby. (TR. 118). Before the mothc 
was released from the hospital a tubelegation was performec 
(TR. 208). The child 1vas placed temporarily in <JJ1 emergenc 
shelter facility by the Division of Family Serve~ and 
subsequently on order of the Juvenile Court placed in a 
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foster home. (TR. 195). The child has been in the same 
foster home ever since for a period of over five years. 
(TR. 195). The child is in an adoptable status and it 
would be possible for the foster parents to adopt it. 
(TR. 194,195). The child has been under the continuous 
legal custody and guardianship of the Division of Family 
Services. The physical problems have been repaired in 
a series of surgical operations and at the present time 
the child appears both physically and mentally active and 
normal with only some speech difficulty. (TR. 163). There 
was no evidence that the child's parents have contributed 
anything to the support or care of the child. The Juvenile 
Court has continued custody in the Division of Family 
Services on findings that the mother is unable to care for 
the child. (See orders of January 21, 1975, R. 18; January 
20, 1976, R. 19; March 22, 1977, R. 36). The mother is 
not asking for restoration of custody in this proceeding. 
(TR. 239). There have been prolonged periods of time 
during which the mother has neither requested nor had 
contact with the child. (TR. 132,150,156,163,210). 
The mother has changed residences frequently and for a time 
was unlocatable. (TR. 163,176). She has had several places 
of employment. (TR. 165,247) and is uncertain as to the 
sources of her income. (TR. 229). She was on welfare 
until eligible for social security income from a deceased 
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husband. (TR. 235) . She has an older child (age 6) living 
with her parents in Nebraska, city or address unknown. 
(TR. 200,242). This child has lived with her parents and 
been in their continuous care since 10 months of age. 
(TR. 2 4 2) . She has never, during that time, at tempb"d 
care or physical custody of said child. (TR. 242). Said 
child prefers to live with the grandparents. (TR. 247). 
Professional testimony was introduced that the mother is 
mentally retarded with a very inadequate personality (TR. 
I 55) , that she lacks mental capacity to improve her parentin:
1 
ability (TR. 57), and that although she might be able to ~ 
provide basic survival care for the child P.L.L. the child I 
would not thrive or be adequately stimulated. (TR. 35,36, j 
42,49). There was testimony regarding her neglect and 
inability to care for the child P.L.L. during periods 
of visitation. (TR. 87). The guardian ad litem appointed 
by the Juvenile Court to protect the interest of the child I 
i 
' recommended termination of the mother's parental rights. 
(R. 37). 
Under these circumstances it seems obvious that 
continuation of appellant's parental ties, thus preventing 
a permanent placement and adoption of P.L.L., would not 
be in the child's best interest. The evidence demonstrat~ 
that both the past conduct and the condition (circumstance 
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of the appellant have been and are seriously detrimental 
to the child P.L.L. and render the appellant unfit and 
incompetent as a parent to said child. (Section 78-32-
48(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, Replacement Volume 9A). 
It is respondent's position that not only have 
the statutory requisites been met for termination, but 
further, under these circumstances, the child P.L.L. has 
a constitutional right to be cut adrift from the appellant's 
parental ties. 
It should be noted that a proceeding in the Juvenile 
Court is in the interest of the juvenile - not the parent, 
nor the state, nor so~e other party, The petition and all 
subsequent court documents shall be entitled: "State of 
Utah, in the interestof ___ ,a person under eighteen years 
of age." (Section 78-3a-23, U.C.A. 1953, Replacement 
Volume 9A). It is the duty of the trial court, and the 
appellant court, to act in the best interest of the child, 
not the adult parent. (State in the Interest of A, supra, 
at page 799). Admittedly, there is a presumption that it 
is in the best interest of the child to be reared by its 
natural parents - but this is a rebuttable presumption 
and can be overcome when the trier of the fact is convinced 
by a preponderence of the evidence that the welfare of 
the child requires termination. In re Winger, supra. 
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There is seldom reluctance to terminate parental ties 
in order to protect a child's physical well being. There 
is little hesitation to sever biological bonds if there is 
neglect or abuse,and it is not difficult to affirm the 
unfitness of a parent quilty of such conduct. But equally 
inimical to a child may be the trauma and emotional 
injury triggered by the termination of non-biological 
parental tics formed in early years. Such an intfc:t:ruption, 
especially where no reassertion of custody by the natural 
parent is possible, should likewise justify a termination 
of the biological tie. Unlike adults, children have no 
sophisticated concept of blood-tie relationships until 
quite late in ':heir development. A blood-tie legal 
preference is rather obscure and means nothing to a child 
who has formed bonds with another parent figure who is 
providing love and care. It is a mistake to subordinate 
the psycholo~ical well being of the child to an adult's 
non possessory assertion of biological preference. For 
young children under age of 5 every disruption of continuit 
affects any achievements attained and may completely 
reverse the child's successful pattern. (See Drs. Goldste: 
Freud and Solint, Beyond the Best Interest of the Child, 
Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1973). In light of P.L.L.', 
fragile beginning it would seem tragic to either transfer 
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the child from a successful placement to a rather 
marginal environment and frightening prospect in the 
custody of appellant, or to shut the door to any permanent 
adoptive circumstance in a stable surrounding. 
Many courts have raised the psychological-parent 
concept to a constitutional base and dictated that a 
child whose placement is in question is entitled to 
the least detrimental available alternative for safe-
guarding his growth and development. In the case 
of In re Roy, N.Y. Fam. Ct. ~.Y. Cty., 4/5/77, 3 FLR 
2380, 393 N.Y.S.2d 515, the court held a natural mother's 
possessory claim to a 16 year old son who has lived with 
foster parents since one year old, is severed by such 
an "extraordinary circumstance", which circumstance 
triggers the best interest rule and authorizes the boys 
adoption by foster parent. Of particular interest in 
relation to instant case is following language of the 
court: 
"His biological mother is not seeking 
his return to her; her claim is that-she 
can maintain her title to him -- that 
she can prevent his adoption and the 
termination of her right to call herself 
a parent ... " 
"For this court to refuse to consider the 
child's best interest because of an adult's 
title to him, albeit a biological parent's, 
seemingly would be unconstitutional. To 
preclude a person by virtue of his birth 
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from a benefit -- from a measure promoting 
his interests -- would be anomaly in con-
stitutional law .... the minor has an 
unequivocal and unquestionable interest 
in termination of hi~ parent's title to 
him, and therefore he seemingly has a 
constitutional right to freedom from the 
parental possessory claim" 
In re J.S.R., D.C. Ct. App., 5/26/77, 3 FLR 2500, it 
held that in a termination proceeding the "best interest 
of the child" test was not unconstitutionally vague and 
that the standard requires the trial court to find the 
"least detrimental alternative available for the child." 
"We think it plain that the standard 
'best interest of the child' requires the 
judge, recognizing human frailty and man's 
limitations with respect to forecasting 
the future course of human events, to make 
an informed and rational judgment, free 
of bias and favor, as to the least detri-
mental or the available alternatives." 
The integration of a child into a viable family 
unit is more important to the child than maintaining a 
non-custodial natural parent-child relationship. In the 
case of State v. Blum, (Or. App. 1970), 463 P.2d 367, 
which was cited with approval by this court in the case 
of In re Winger, supra, the Oregon Appeals Court, under a 
deprivation statute identical to ours, affirmed an order 
that parental rights of a mentally ill mother could be 
terminated upon finding lh~t she was unfit by reason 
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"It is important that the child have 
a sense of belonging to a family. This 
is one of the things we look for after we 
say that our prime consideration is the best 
interests of the child. It is not in the 
best interest of the child to keep him 
forever in a limbo--a limbo that is 
terminated, if at all, when on some 
uncertain date his mentally ill mother 
recovers and gives him a normal mother's 
care. For this child it may well be 
that at his present age of seven and one-
half years it is already too late to success-
fully integrate him into a family. If it 
is not too late, it is important to get it 
done soon." (463 P. 2d, p. 370). 
In the case of Organization of Foster Families v. 
Dumpson, 418 F.Supp. 277 (1976), certain foster parents 
attempted to restrain the New York City Human Resources 
Administration from transferring foster children without 
affording a constitutionally appropriate fair hearing, 
claiming that both the foster children and the foster 
parents enjoyed a familial right to privacy similar to 
that recognized in a biological family relationship 
because of the psychological ties which had been formed, 
which was protected under both the Equal Protection and 
Due Process clauses of the ~ourteenth Amendment. The 
Federal District Court agreed with the foster parents 
recognizing that the minor children had a constitutionally 
protected "liberty interest to familial privacy"; viz., 
a constitutional right to the preservation of the least 
restrictive familial relationship which can not be deprived 
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without due process. On appeal to the United States 
Supreme Court (Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 
431 u.s. 816, 87 S.Ct. 2094, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977), the 
Supreme Court recognized that "the importance of the 
familial relationship to the individuals involved stems 
from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimae: 
of daily association, and from the role it plays in 
promoting a way of life through the instruction of 
children, as well as from the fact of blood relationship." 
(97 S.Ct. at page 2110). Further the court recognized 
that " ... emotional ties between foster parent and foster 
child are in many cases quite close, and undoubtedly in 
some as close as those existing in biological families." 
(97 S.Ct., footnote 52 at page 2110). 
The following language of the Dumpson court is 
relevant and significant: 
"The time has long since passed when children 
were considered mere chattels of the adults 
with whom they lived .... lt lS by now well-
settled that children are 'persons; wlthln 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment whose 
rights are entitled to protection agalnst 
state abridgement. (Authorities omitted) 
Foremost among those rights, as the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held, is the right to be 
heard before being 'condemned to suffer 
grievous loss'". (Authorities omitted) 418 
F.Supp. 282 (Emphasis added). 
Of special interest in regard protection of the child 
in termination cases are two recent cases, one from the 
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State of New Mexico and one from the State of California. 
In the case of New Mexico Health and Social Services Dept. 
v. Smith, N.M. Ct.App., l/9/79, 5 FLR 2346, the New Mexico 
appeals court affirmed a judgment terminating parental 
rights of child who had been in foster care for 2 of its 
2 l/2 year life on the grounds that she was "unable to 
discharge her natural responsibilities as a parent due to 
mental incapacity, hospitalization, incarceration periods 
and the use of alcohol." A termination statute, similar 
to ours, was involved which required a finding that the 
parent was unfit resulting in serious harm to the child. 
The trial court did not rule that the child suffered 
physical harm but found that there was mental and emotional 
harm as a result of the failure of the mother to perform 
the natural obligation of care and support. The consequence 
of the mother's failure was the absence of a parent-child 
relationship. In other words, absence of a parent-child 
relationship constitutes serious harm sufficient to justify 
termination of parental rights. So in our instant case, 
absence of a parent-child relationship between the appellant 
and P.L.L. as a result of appellant's inability or lack 
of interest in providing care and support of the child 
renders the mother unfit and justifies termination of her 
parental rights. In the case of In re Heidi T., Cal. Ct. App. 
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1st Dist., 12/27/78, 5 FLR 2350, it was held that the 
mother's continuing mental illness which rendered her 
incapable of providing support justified termination 
of parental rights regarding two children, 12 and 11, 
who had been in foster care for ten years. 
1979 is the ''International Year of the Child" 
as designated by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations. This year commemorates the 20th Anniversary 
of the Unlted Nations Declaration of the Rights of the 
Child. Privilege 2 of said Declaration provides as 
follows: 
The child shall enjoy special protection, 
and shall be given opportunities and facilities, 
by law and by other means, to enable him to 
develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritual} 
and socially in a healthy and normal manner and 
in conditions of freedom and dignity. In the 
enactment of laws for this purpose the best 
interest of the child shall be the paramount 
consideration. 
It is not argued that a United Nations Declaration 
of Principle establishes a constitutional right. It is 
suggested, however, that to deny the least restrictive 
alternative for P.L.L. to develop in a manner described 
in said principle shall deprive P.L.L. of the liberty 
vouchsafed under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is acknowledged that termination of parental 
rights is an extreme action to be very carefully considered. 
The seriousness of the circumstance should not, however, 
becloud the essentiality of the procedure when appropriate. 
The Legislature has recognized that termination may well 
be the proper action by authorizing such procedure. 
In view of the importance of the matter this court 
has in a series of recent cases spelled out certain tests 
that should be followed in applying the statutory language. 
The tests are as follows: 
l. The termination order must be supported by a 
preponderance of the evidence. (In re the Interest of 
Winger, supra, 1975). 
2. The natural parent is unable to supply physical 
and emotional care for the child. (Ibid.) 
3. This circumstance will continue beyond a time 
in which the child could otherwise be integrated into a 
suitable substitute horne. (Ibid.) 
4. The conduct and condition of the natural parent 
is a substantial departure from normal parental relation-
ships. (State in the Interest of Walter B., supra, 1978). 
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6. The social agency must render reasonable efforts 
of assistance. (Ibid.) 
7. It must be clearly manifest that the parent 
cannot or will not correct the deficiencies which exist. 
(State in the Interest of E.B., 578 P.2d 831, (Utah, 1978)). 
8. The termination must be in the best interest of 
the child. (State in the Interest of R.J., H.J. D.J., 
supra, 1978). 
Without belaboring further argument it appears 
obvious that the preponderance of the evidence supports 
all of these tests. It would seem to be an effort in 
futility, and certainly not in the interest of the child 
to return the child to appellant for some sort of trial 
period. The die has been cast. The essential thing now 
is to conclude a permanent placement that will continue 
to affort P.L.L. prospect for becoming a well-adjusted, 
self-sustaining individual. This should now be the 
consideration of paramount importance. The order of the 
Juvenile Court should be affirmed. 
Dated this 9th day of March, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
FRANKLYN B. MATHESON 
SHARON PEACOCK 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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